

Southern California Epistemology Network (SCEN)
Meeting Nov. 8th, 2025

Workshop venue: Humanities Instructional Building (HIB) 55, UCI Campus.

Parking: Mesa Parking Structure

11:00 - 11:50	Justin Greenberg (UCI), <i>Experiential Memory and the Concept of the Past</i>
11:50 - 12:40	Levy Wang (USC), <i>The Rationality of (False) Hope</i>
12:40 - 1:30	lunch break (a light lunch will be served)
1:30 - 2:20	Gila Sher (UCSD), <i>Truth as a Human Value</i>
2:20 - 3:10	Peter Graham (UCR), <i>The Future of Testimony: Artificial Intelligence and the Scope of Knowledge through Comprehension</i>
3:10 - 4:00	Margaret Gilbert (UCI), <i>An(other) Argument for a Non-Summative, Non-Correlativist, Account of Collective Belief</i>

Justin Greenberg, *Experiential Memory and the Concept of the Past*

Abstract: Each of us has the ability to think about particular events that have occurred in our lives. This ability is used, for instance, when a subject thinks about her recent trip to Switzerland, the day her family adopted their first dog, or her latest visit to the grocery store. In each of these cases the subject's thought is directed towards a particular past event. The question this talk aims to answer is this: What is required for a subject to be able to entertain thoughts about the past? I begin with a critical examination of an argument put forth by Dorothea Debus (2014). On her view, a subject's ability to think about the past depends on her experience of particular past events — that is, her experiential memories (see also, Hoerl 2017). My objection is that Debus' argument fails because it does not distinguish between what is necessary for a subject's ability to think about the past, on the one hand, and what is necessary for a subject to fully grasp the concept of the past, on the other. By failing to draw this crucial distinction Debus over-intellectualizes temporal cognition. I then propose and develop an alternative account according to which a subject's ability to think about the past is founded upon her perception of temporal durations (Kelly 2005). I conclude by showing that this view has historical precedence in Husserl's (1964) distinction between retention and recollection.

Levy Wang, *The Rationality of (False) Hope*

Abstract: Epistemologists, philosophers of mind, philosophers of religion, and medical ethicists alike have written on the rationality of hope, and they agree that the rationality of "false hope"—such as hoping a terminally ill patient survives against minuscule odds—is the most challenging. Drawing on theories of rationality and hope, I provide a comprehensive framework to evaluate the rationality of hope. False hope can be fitting and coherent. However, it becomes irrational if it leads to the misuse of limited resources that are counterproductive to the agent's goal. This kind of irrationality is especially prominent in medical settings, where agents tend to have limited physical, cognitive, and financial resources.

Gila Sher, *Truth as a Human Value*

Abstract: The talk presents a new, value-theoretic, conception of truth inspired by recent crises of truth (both social and intellectual). It shows how this conception leads to new solutions to classical philosophical problems, and it concludes with a general outlook on human values, based on the new perspective offered by truth.

Peter Graham, *The Future of Testimony: Artificial Intelligence and the Scope of Knowledge through Comprehension*

Abstract: Knowledge through "testimony" comes from another person who knows. But what about our current and growing reliance on Artificial Intelligence for information? Does that involve acquiring knowledge from "minds" that don't know? This paper examines some of the details surrounding this question.

Margaret Gilbert, *An(other) Argument for a Non-Summative, Non-Correlativist, Account of Collective Belief*

Abstract: People often speak about what we---or they---believe. In short, they often invoke collective beliefs. In earlier work, in light of humdrum examples of collective belief formation, I have argued for an account of collective belief that does not imply that when we believe something all or most of us personally believes it. Indeed, it does not imply that any of us personally believes what the collective does. In other terms, this account is neither summative, nor (even) correlativist. In this talk, I propose and consider another argument for an account of this sort.