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COLLOQUIUM **ELIOT MICHAELSON**

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Knotty Promises, or How to Lose Friends and Alienate People

Theories of promising standardly assume that binding promises require an intention to communicate what one is promising to the listener. And similarly for consent. The present paper illustrates how we can promise and consent-or at least do something that looks very much like promising and consenting, and which has very similar normative effects-without so intending. Any way of trying to adequately explain these cases, I argue, is going to require substantially rethinking our earlier theories of moral address. I aim to provide a new account of moral address, and of address more broadly, that can smoothly account for both these and other problem cases.

If you have any guestions, please contact philos@uci.edu

BIO

Department of

Philosophy

- Eliot Michaelson is a Reader in the Department of Philosophy at King's College London, and an Honorary Associate Professor of Linguistics at University College London. He received his PhD from UCLA in 2013.
- He works primarily on core topics in philosophy of language, like meaning and reference. He also works on the border of philosophy of language and ethics, on issues such as lying and insincerity, fake news, online speech, and consent and promising. He maintains independent research interests in the nature of skills, the metaphysics of color, and the ethics of eating.
- He published in journals such as Noûs, Ergo, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Philosophical Quarterly, Inquiry, and others. He coauthored the SEP entry on "Reference" and co-edited the volume Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics (Oxford university Press, 2018).