TRUST DISTRUST & FORGIVENESS

Maria Baghramian
Annalisa Coliva
Nicolas Cornell
Jason D’Cruz
Heather Douglas
Paul Faulkner
Miranda Fricker
Jeffrey Helmreich
Dana Nelkin
C. Thi Nguyen
Cailin O’Connor
Gloria Origgi
Duncan Pritchard
Judith Simon

SEPTEMBER 16—17 2022

Sponsored by
Knowledge, Technology and Society Research Center
Center for Legal Philosophy
PERITIA
The UCI Humanities Center
Department of Philosophy
SPEAKERS

MARIA BAGHRAMIAN
University College Dublin

ANNALISA COLIVA
University of California Irvine
NICOLAS CORNELL
University of Michigan

JASON D'CRUZ
University at Albany

HEATHER DOUGLAS
Michigan State University
EVENT PROGRAM
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, HG 1010

8:30 AM - 9:00 AM
REGISTRATION AND GREETINGS

9:00 AM - 10:00 AM
LOCKDOWN AND A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO LOSE TRUST
Paul Faulkner

10:05 AM - 11:05 AM
DIS/TRUSTING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?
Judith Simon

11:05 AM - 11:30 AM
COFFEE BREAK

11:30 AM - 12:30 PM
TRUST, SCIENCE, AND THE QUESTION OF OBJECTIVITY
Maria Baghramian

12:30 PM - 2:00 PM
LUNCH
GRADUATE POSTER PRESENTATIONS
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, HG 1010

ANNA PEDERNESCHI
University of California Irvine

JINGYI WU
University of California Irvine
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM  ARE OUR HINGE COMMITMENTS A KIND OF TRUST?  
Duncan Pritchard

3:05 PM - 4:05 PM  TRUST AS AN UNQUESTIONING ATTITUDE  
C. Thi Nguyen

4:05 PM - 4:30 PM  COFFEE BREAK

4:30 PM - 5:30 PM  HINGE TRUST  
Annalisa Coliva

5:35 PM - 6:36 PM  TRUST AS AN UNDERGRAD STANCE  
Jason D'Cruz

7:15 PM  DINNER AT NEWPORT LANDING
EVENT PROGRAM
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, HG 1030

9:00 AM - 10:00 AM  
THE DUTY TO TRUST AND THE DUTY TO BE TRUSTFUL: A MORAL ASYMMETRY OF TRUST  
Gloria Origgi

10:05 AM - 11:05 AM  
INSTITUTIONALIZED UNTRUSTWORTHINESS  
Miranda Fricker

11:05 AM - 11:30 AM  
COFFEE BREAK

11:30 AM - 12:30 PM  
THE ESSENTIALITY OF SHARED VALUES FOR TRUST IN SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE  
Heather Douglas

12:30 PM - 2:00 PM  
LUNCH
TRUST, MISTRUST, AND POLARIZATION IN EPISTEMIC NETWORKS
Cailin O'Connor

3:05 PM - 4:05 PM

STRICT LIABILITY IN LAW AND MORALS
Jeffrey Helmreich

4:05 PM - 4:30 PM

COFFEE BREAK

4:30 PM - 5:30 PM

GAMBLING ON OTHERS AND RELYING ON OTHERS
Nicolas Cornell

5:35 PM - 6:35 PM

CHANGING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE:
FORGIVENESS AND LETTING GO
Dana Nelkin

7:15 PM

DINNER AT ANGELINA'S
ABSTRACTS
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, HG 1010

LOCKDOWN AND A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO LOSE TRUST
Paul Faulkner

To reduce the COVID-19 death rate, the UK Government imposed a national lockdown that shut schools and business and required people to stay at home. This lockdown instituted a social coordination problem: it demands the individual must bear a cost – a significant restriction to their movement – in order to achieve a collective good. Initially there were remarkably high levels of social compliance with the lockdown restrictions, but the Government defense of Mr. Cummings corresponded with a notable drop in levels of social compliance and levels of trust in government. By considering the logic of social coordination problems, this paper offers an explanation as to why these drops in compliance and trust were to be expected.

DIS/TRUSTING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?
Judith Simon

Recent advances in data analysis have led to the development of an abundance of technologies to support human-decision making in many societal domains. Such applications, often labeled artificial intelligence, employing machine learning and other types of statistical data analysis for classification, prediction, and decision support. Due to their widespread utilization, they affect most of us on a daily basis, albeit in different ways. As countless cases have demonstrated, data-based systems are prone to biases and may further entrench or even increase inequalities and discrimination by transforming biased evidence into seemingly neutral numbers. As a result, the question arises whether and under what conditions we can or should trust such systems. In my talk I will first turn to the question whether we can sensibly talk about trust in AI systems. Proposing a socio-technical view on AI, I will argue that we can trust AI systems, if we conceive them as systems consisting of networks of technologies and human actors, but that we should trust them if and only if they are trustworthy. I will then investigate some epistemic and ethical requirements for trustworthy systems and conclude my talk with some thoughts on the relation of trust, distrust and forgiveness in the context of such data-based decision support systems.
TRUST, SCIENCE, AND THE QUESTION OF OBJECTIVITY
Maria Baghramian

Trust is essential to science because the effective conduct of science requires trust among scientists’ science-based policies can be implemented effectively where there is trust in the policy and the science behind it. There is a growing consensus, at least among philosophers of science and epistemologists, that trust in science, in both above senses, has an irreducibly normative dimension. Science is infused with values both in the context of discovery and in the context of justification. Values, it has been argued repeatedly, fill the gap between theory and data and guide the decisions scientists take when engaging with risky inductive calculations. Trustworthy science then, according to this view, is not value free. Moreover, the values in question are not only epistemic but also moral or ethical. A serious concern arising from this line of thought is whether a value laden science can ever meet the long held ideal of scientific objectivity. Will such conception of science not be prey to the dual dangers of relativism and subjectivism? Or to put it more starkly: should a value laden science be trusted? I consider the sources of these worries and briefly assess some key responses, including an influential line of thought presented by Helen Longino (1990 and 2002).

AN ANALYSIS OF BIAS AND DISTRUST IN SOCIAL HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY
Anna Pederneschi

The pervasiveness of trust in our everyday lives makes it a collective “bonding agent” that allows us to participate in epistemic practices. Distrust, on the other hand, can be quite damaging. Philosophical literature has focused on trust, considering distrust as a mere afterthought. However, I think understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for our testimonial practices. My general aim is to show that unmotivated distrust is irrational and based on negative identity bias. Firstly, I will adopt Annalisa Coliva’s account of social hinge epistemology and of hinge trust as the basic stance for our epistemic practices. Secondly, I will focus on how distrust based on negative identity bias can spread across other domains of interaction and jeopardize the practice itself. Thirdly, I will adopt an account of bias as a defeater to enforce the claim that unmotivated distrust is irrational. Finally, I will highlight the main difference between motivated and unmotivated distrust in testimonial practices, such that motivated distrust is only allowed within a particular domain of interaction where no testimonial knowledge or justified belief is transmitted in the first place.

EPISTEMIC ADVANTAGE ON THE MARGIN: A NETWORK STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY
Jingyi Wu

I use network models to simulate social learning situations in which the dominant group ignores or devalues testimony from the marginalized group. I find that the marginalized group ends up with several epistemic advantages due to testimonial ignorance and devaluation. The results provide one possible explanation for a key claim of standpoint epistemology, the inversion thesis, by casting it as a consequence of another key claim of the theory, the unidirectional failure of testimonial reciprocity. Moreover, the results complicate the understanding and application of previously discovered network epistemology effects, notably the Zollman effect.
ARE OUR HINGE COMMITMENTS A KIND OF TRUST?  
Duncan Pritchard

According to the kind of account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the ‘hinge’ role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that the propositional attitude involved in hinge commitments is not one of trusting at all.

TRUST AS AN UNQUESTIONING ATTITUDE  
C. Thi Nguyen

Most accounts of trust presume that trust can only be directed towards agents. In these accounts, trust involves attributing some positive agential status to the trusted, such as goodwill or responsiveness. I argue that there is another distinctive form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. When one trusts in this sense, one stops questioning whether the trusted can perform their function. And one can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects. When I trust my climbing rope, I put concerns about its reliability out of mind. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, non-agential objects could never be the proper target for such a normatively charged attitude as trust. For one thing, trust brings with it the possibility of betrayal. How could betrayal ever be an appropriate response to an object? I suggest that we use the unquestioning attitude to integrate other objects into our own agency. It lets us weld external sources into our cognition and activity — to let them inside, so to speak. Thus, we can feel betrayed by objects in the same way we can feel betrayed by our memory or our hands. We are betrayed because something that we took to be a component of our agency has failed to function as it ought. And these considerations can help us to understand our relationship to — and vulnerability towards — the technologies that we trust, such as our phones, search engines, and social media networks.

HINGE TRUST  
Annalisa Coliva

In this paper, I draw on Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* to characterize what may be called “hinge trust” — that is, a basic stance of openness and reliance on objects, people, cognitive faculties, and more. Such a basic stance is also the one that, according to him, we have towards “hinges” — a host of propositions that, while having an empirical form, play the role of norms of evidential significance, at least in context.

I argue that hinge trust can profitably be brought to bear on present-day debates about trust and that it can help partly re-orient them. Hinge trust can also help illuminate the rationality or irrationality of distrust and has significant consequences for the epistemology of testimony.
TRUST AS AN UNGUARDED STANCE
Jason D'Cruz

The account of interpersonal trust I develop - Trust as an Unguarded Stance – centers the encounter of two or more persons in a trusting relationship, thereby recovering the connection elaborated by Baier (1986) between trust and intimacy. On the view that emerges, trust and distrust are basic orientations that we take towards people. This departs from the more common framing of the basic form of trust as "two people and a task": A trust B to ø. Trust as an Unguarded Stance explains trust's advantages for efficiency and agential power as well as trust's significance for our condition as fragile beings whose flourishing and very survival depends on the decency and care of others.
THE DUTY TO TRUST AND THE DUTY TO BE TRUSTFUL: A MORAL ASYMMETRY OF TRUST
Gloria Origgi

Trust is a complex attitude that has emotional, cognitive, and moral dimensions. A difficulty to reduce trust to a simple emotional attitude is that trust raises normative pressures: if someone asks you to be trusted you feel the normative pressure of not letting him or her down, and if someone trusts you, you feel the normative pressure of honoring his or her trust. These normative pressures seem to have an irreducibly social character: pressures are effective insofar as they may raise emotions of shame in those who violate the norm of trust and resentment and contempt in those who are victims of the violation. In this paper I will investigate the relation between the affective dimension of these normative pressures and their moral dimension by arguing that an important moral asymmetry exists between the duty to trust and the duty to be trustful.

INSTITUTIONALIZED UNTRUSTWORTHINESS
Miranda Fricker

I will tentatively explore the idea that we need to be able to trust, and not merely rely on, at least some of our institutions—for instance, those essential to liberal democratic processes, such as police investigation. What are the conditions of trusting an institution? Perhaps that it reliably achieves good outcomes because of relevant good motivating values that are embedded in its ethos—the institutional correlate of individual character. Once we acknowledge this, we have already arrived at a virtue-theoretic idea of institutional trustworthiness. By way of negative illustration, and inspired by recent work by Jennifer Lackey and Saul Kassin, I will analyse a certain prescribed procedure of police investigation as lacking trustworthiness on both counts—the standard procedure is neither reliable nor motivated by good epistemic values, and thus exemplifies not a trustworthy institutional process but rather a powerfully institutionalized ethical-epistemic vice with social constructive power.
THE ESSENTIALITY OF SHARED VALUES FOR TRUST IN SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE
Heather Douglas

Although the importance of shared values has been acknowledged for trust in science (e.g., Irzik & Kurtulumus 2018), it is often not seen as essential to trust, as not being necessary, but rather can strengthen trust when available (e.g., “enhanced trust”). I will argue in this talk that this view is mistaken, if trust is to be more than trust that someone is speaking what the speaker thinks is true—i.e., trust that a speaker is honest and truth-seeking, I will take the view that trust in science requires more than belief that scientists are honest and truth-seeking, and should include that what scientists say is reliable and useable for decision-making. For this sense of trust, an alignment of shared goals and concerns is needed. This is particularly true for cases where it turns out the science is wrong and even harmful. Requests to be forgiven for being human, for making mistakes, require that those who made the mistakes were properly concerned about those harmed, and that requires concern for the values of those harmed.

AN ANALYSIS OF BIAS AND DISTRUST IN SOCIAL HINGE EPISTEMOLOGY
Anna Pedernesi

The pervasiveness of trust in our everyday lives makes it a collective “bonding agent” that allows us to participate in epistemic practices. Distrust, on the other hand, can be quite damaging. Philosophical literature has focused on trust, considering distrust as a mere afterthought. However, I think understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for our testimonial practices. My general aim is to show that unmotivated distrust is irrational and based on negative identity bias. Firstly, I will adopt Annalisa Coliva’s account of social hinge epistemology and of hinge trust as the basic stance for our epistemic practices. Secondly, I will focus on how distrust based on negative identity bias can spread across other domains of interaction and jeopardize the practice itself. Thirdly, I will adopt an account of bias as a defeater to enforce the claim that unmotivated distrust is irrational. Finally, I will highlight the main difference between motivated and unmotivated distrust in testimonial practices, such that motivated distrust is only allowed within a particular domain of interaction where no testimonial knowledge or justified belief is transmitted in the first place.

EPISTEMIC ADVANTAGE ON THE MARGIN:
A NETWORK STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY
Jingyi Wu

I use network models to simulate social learning situations in which the dominant group ignores or devalues testimony from the marginalized group. I find that the marginalized group ends up with several epistemic advantages due to testimonial ignorance and devaluation. The results provide one possible explanation for a key claim of standpoint epistemology, the inversion thesis, by casting it as a consequence of another key claim of the theory, the unidirectional failure of testimonial reciprocity. Moreover, the results complicate the understanding and application of previously discovered network epistemology effects, notably the Zollman effect.
TRUST, MISTRUST, AND POLARIZATION IN EPISTEMIC NETWORKS
Cailin O’Connor

This talk considers how various trust dynamics impact learning in groups. Using network models, we ask: what happens when individuals do not trust those with different beliefs? What about those with different identities? Or what if individuals mistrust evidence shared with them that seems to conflict with their current beliefs? As we show, each of these conditions can lead to polarization over matters of fact, though the mechanisms by which that polarization arises are different. The talk concludes by grappling with the real-world relevance of these models.

STRICT LIABILITY IN LAW AND MORALS
Jeffrey Helmreich

In many circumstances, the law applies "strict liability" to those whose actions ended up harming others, no matter how blameless the action or inevitable the harm. In so doing, the law runs afoul of familiar moral orthodoxies, like the principle that responsibility should track fault and the axiom "ought implies can." Here I defend these cases of strict liability and attempt to reconcile them with the moral intuitions that make them controversial. The defense focuses, among other things, on the injurer's having knowingly elicited the victim's trust.

GAMBLING ON OTHERS AND RELYING ON OTHERS
Nicolas Cornell

Gambling on another person and relying on another person are similar but intuitively distinct phenomena. I argue that gambling is distinguished by the stance that it necessarily involves towards the bet-upon conduct. It then contends that the stance of the gambler entails that the gambler has no standing to complain against the bet-upon person for losses that result. This seemingly small point may, I argue, have much broader significance, as it suggests a way forward in thinking about our standing to hold others accountable in both morality and the law.

CHANGING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE: FORGIVENESS AND LETTING GO
Dana Nelkin

Forgiveness is often distinguished from other ways of eliminating (or reducing) blame, such as letting go. In this paper, I focus on a conception of forgiveness as normative landscape change (i.e., the alteration of the distribution of relevant parties' rights and obligations), and explore the distinction between forgiveness, so understood, and letting go. In so doing, I highlight the explanatory power of the emerging picture and compare it to one in which the distinction between letting go and forgiveness is focused primarily on a kind of attitude change (see, for example, Bruning and Milam 2022). I conclude by comparing the implications of both forgiveness and letting go for other important phenomena such as reconciliation.
A special thanks to our sponsors...

CENTER FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
University of California, Irvine

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
University of California, Irvine

KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY RESEARCH CENTER
University of California, Irvine

PERITIA

THE UCI HUMANITIES CENTER
University of California, Irvine

...for their support in making this conference possible!
A special thanks to our sponsors...

PERITIA disclaimer:
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883.

...for their support in making this conference possible!