A connection between pragmatism and relativism is often taken for granted in the philosophical debate on relativism, although classical pragmatists – Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey – were not particularly concerned with the issue. In order to assess whether such a connection is justified and in what terms, I examine the controversial pragmatist conception of truth, as it emerges from the writings of Peirce, James and Dewey, and compare it with alethic relativism. I will argue that, besides there being relevant differences between the three approaches, their relationship with relativism is more articulated that it usually appears, even in the case of James’ often criticized definition of truth as usefulness. Finally, I will extend the discussion to the broader themes of moral and cultural relativism.

Date: January 16, 2019

Time: 12:00 – 2:00 PM

Event Location: HIB 55