In this talk I focus on a new pattern of argument in favour of Uniqueness, namely the thesis that for any body of total evidence E there is just one perfectly rational doxastic attitude one or multiple agents can have given E. The argument starts from the premise that, given Uniqueness, we can use rationality ascriptions, namely ascriptions of the form “S’s belief is rational” to perform various functions, such as dividing epistemic labour, guiding our deferential practices and planning what to believe in given circumstances. However, if we accept the denial of Uniqueness, i.e. Permissivism, rationality ascriptions cannot be used to perform such functions. I argue that this argument fails by showing how Permissivism can account for the plurality of functions performed by rationality ascriptions.

**Date:** October 31, 2018  
**Time:** 12:30am- 2:00pm  
**Event Location:** HIB 55