Spring Quarter

Over the past thirty years philosophers have become increasingly interested in the nature of the social world. The kinds of questions discussed include the following. When do two or more people count as doing something together, such as going for a walk together? What are we talking about when we speak of the beliefs of groups as opposed to the beliefs of individual human beings? Is such talk merely a shorthand way of talking about what all or most group members think? What about group emotions? When two or more people agree on a plan of action, what is it exactly that they do? That is, what is an agreement? What sense can be made of the notion of an “implicit” agreement? Do implicit agreements obligate? And in what way do any agreements obligate the parties to respect the terms of the agreement? To what extent, if at all, does it make sense to think of the partners in a long-term relationship as “two become one”? More generally, to what kind of group is the notion of a “unity” of persons clearly applicable? The answers to such questions bear on central issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Such issues include the following. What sense, if any, can be made of a “social contract” that lies at the heart of a political society? Can a group---as opposed to its individual members---be blameworthy? If so, what are the implications of group blameworthiness to that of the individual members of the group? What kinds of punishment of groups, if any, are morally justifiable? How strong a barrier do group beliefs and emotions such as distrust and hostility towards other groups present to the reconciliation of groups in conflict? This course will focus on some of the central questions in the field.

In this seminar we will focus on the notion of justification. Some of the views we will examine are Harman's in Change in View, Boghossian's in Content and Justification as well as some proposals made within hinge epistemology.