Law, Reason and Value Talk: Ken Simons (UCI Law)
Department: Philosophy
Date and Time: November 9, 2017 | 5:00 PM-6:30 PMEvent Location: LAW 3750
Event Details
Title: "Actual, Apparent, and Hypothetical Consent in Tort Law"
THE UCI CENTER FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY PRESENTS: PROF. KEN SIMONS (UCI) ON CONSENT (11/9)
THE UCI CENTER FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY PRESENTS: PROF. KEN SIMONS (UCI) ON CONSENT (11/9)
Please join us Thursday, November 9th, at 5 pm in LAW 3750, for the next meeting of Law, Reason and Value, the jurisprudence colloquium co-sponsored by the School of Law and the School of Humanities.
Our speaker will be Kenneth W. Simons, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at UCI, who will discuss 'Actual, Apparent, and Hypothetical Consent in Tort Law' (summary below).
The talk will run 5-6:30 pm in Law 3750. A small faculty dinner will follow; to RSVP please email jhelmrei@uci.edu. Thanks!
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ACTUAL, APPARENT, AND HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT IN TORT LAW
In this paper (to be distributed shortly), Professor Simons identifies the distinct tort categories of actual consent (plaintiff is willing to permit the actor's conduct), apparent consent (the actor reasonably, but perhaps mistakenly, believes that plaintiff actually consents), and presumed or hypothetical consent (plaintiff is justified in proceeding despite no actual consent because plaintiff would have actually consented, if asked). The categories are applied to many concrete examples, including examples of how tort law should define the scope of consent to sexual conduct.
Our speaker will be Kenneth W. Simons, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at UCI, who will discuss 'Actual, Apparent, and Hypothetical Consent in Tort Law' (summary below).
The talk will run 5-6:30 pm in Law 3750. A small faculty dinner will follow; to RSVP please email jhelmrei@uci.edu. Thanks!
-
ACTUAL, APPARENT, AND HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT IN TORT LAW
In this paper (to be distributed shortly), Professor Simons identifies the distinct tort categories of actual consent (plaintiff is willing to permit the actor's conduct), apparent consent (the actor reasonably, but perhaps mistakenly, believes that plaintiff actually consents), and presumed or hypothetical consent (plaintiff is justified in proceeding despite no actual consent because plaintiff would have actually consented, if asked). The categories are applied to many concrete examples, including examples of how tort law should define the scope of consent to sexual conduct.