The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling

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This paper will focus on a specific problem in the somewhat boundless field of metaphor theory. Although this problem may sound merely psychological, insofar as it includes such terms as "image" and "feeling," I would rather characterize it as a problem arising on the boundary between a semantic theory of metaphor and a psychological theory of imagination and feeling. By a semantic theory, I mean an inquiry into the capacity of metaphor to provide untranslatable information and, accordingly, into metaphor's claim to yield some true insight about reality. The question to which I will address myself is whether such an inquiry may be completed without including as a necessary component a psychological moment of the kind usually described as "image" or "feeling."

At first glance, it seems that it is only in theories in which metaphorical phrases have no informative value and consequently no truth claim that the so-called images or feelings are advocated as substitutive explanatory factors. By substitutive explanation I mean the attempt to derive the alleged significance of metaphorical phrases from their capacity to display streams of images and to elicit feelings that we mistakenly hold for genuine information and for fresh insight into reality. My thesis is that it is not only for theories which deny metaphors any informative value and any truth claim that images and feelings have a constitutive function. I want instead to show that the kind of theory of metaphor initiated by I. A. Richards in Philosophy of Rhetoric, Max Black in Models and Metaphors, Beardsley, Berggren, and others cannot achieve its own goal without including imagining and feeling, that is, without assigning a semantic function to what seems to be mere psychological features and
without, therefore, concerning itself with some accompanying factors extrinsic to the informative kernel of metaphor. This contention seems to run against a well-established—at least since Frege's famous article “Sinn und Bedeutung” and Husserl's Logical Investigations—dichotomy, that between Sinn or sense and Vorstellung or representation, if we understand “sense” as the objective content of an expression and “representation” as its mental actualization, precisely in the form of image and feeling. But the question is whether the functioning of metaphorical sense does not put to the test and even hold at bay this very dichotomy.

The first articulate account of metaphor, that of Aristotle, already provides some hints concerning what I will call the semantic role of imagination (and by implication, feeling) in the establishment of metaphorical sense. Aristotle says of the lexis in general—that is, of dictation, elocution, and style, of which metaphor is one of the figures—that it makes discourse (logos) appear as such and such. He also says that the gift of making good metaphors relies on the capacity to contemplate similarities. Moreover, the vividness of such good metaphors consists in their ability to “set before the eyes” the sense that they display. What is suggested here is a kind of pictorial dimension, which can be called the picturing function of metaphorical meaning.

The tradition of rhetoric confirms that hint beyond any specific theory concerning the semantic status of metaphor. The very expression “figure of speech” implies that in metaphor, as in the other tropes or turns, discourse assumes the nature of a body by displaying forms and traits which usually characterize the human face, man’s “figure”; it is as though the tropes gave to discourse a quasi-bodily externalization. By providing a kind of figurality to the message, the tropes make discourse appear.

Roman Jakobson suggests a similar interpretation when he characterizes the “poetic” function in his general model of communication as the valorization of the message for its own sake. In the same way, Tzvetan Todorov, the Bulgarian theoretician of neo-rhetorics, defines “figure” as the visibility of discourse. Gérard Genette, in Figures I, speaks of deviance as an “inner space of language.” “Simple and common expressions,” he says, “have no form, figures [of speech] have some.”

I am quite aware that these are only hints which point toward a problem rather than toward a statement. Furthermore, I am quite aware

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that they add to this difficulty the fact that they tend to speak metaphorically about metaphor and thus introduce a kind of circularity which obscures the issue. But is not the word “metaphor” itself a metaphor, the metaphor of a displacement and therefore of a transfer in a kind of space? What is at stake is precisely the necessity of these spatial metaphors about metaphor included in our talk about “figures” of speech.

Such being the problem, in what direction are we to look for a correct assessment of the semantic role of imagination and eventually of feeling? It seems that it is in the work of resemblance that a pictorial or iconic moment is implied, as Aristotle suggests when he says that to make good metaphors is to contemplate similarities or (according to some other translations) to have an insight into likeness.

But in order to understand correctly the work of resemblance in metaphor and to introduce the pictorial or iconic moment at the right place, it is necessary briefly to recall the mutation undergone by the theory of metaphor at the level of semantics by contrast with the tradition of classical rhetoric. In this tradition, metaphor was correctly described in terms of deviance, but this deviance was mistakenly ascribed to denotation only. Instead of giving a thing its usual common name, one designates it by means of a borrowed name, a “foreign” name in Aristotle’s terminology. The rationale of this transfer of name was understood as the objective similarity between the things themselves or the subjective similarity between the attitudes linked to the grasping of these things. As concerns the goal of this transfer, it was supposed either to fill up a lexical lacuna, and therefore to serve the principle of economy which rules the endeavor of giving appropriate names to new things, new ideas, or new experiences, or to decorate discourse, and therefore to serve the main purpose of rhetorical discourse, which is to persuade and to please.

The problem of resemblance receives a new articulation in the semantic theory characterized by Max Black as an interaction theory (as opposed to a substitutive theory). The bearer of the metaphorical meaning is no longer the word but the sentence as a whole. The interaction process does not merely consist of the substitution of a word for a word, of a name for a name—which, strictly speaking, defines only metonymy—but in an interaction between a logical subject and a predicate. If metaphor consists in some deviance—this feature is not denied but is described and explained in a new way—this deviance concerns the predicative structure itself. Metaphor, then, has to be described as a deviant predication rather than a deviant denomination. We come closer to what I called the work of resemblance if we ask how this deviant predication obtains. A French theoretician in the field of poetics, Jean Cohen, in Structure du langage poétique, speaks of this deviance in terms of a semantic impertinence, meaning by that the violation of the code of
pertinence or relevance which rules the ascription of predicates in ordinary use.\footnote{Jean Cohen, Structure du langage poétique (Paris, 1966).} The metaphorical statement works as the reduction of this syntagmatic deviance by the establishment of a new semantic pertinence. This new pertinence in turn is secured by the production of a lexical deviance, which is therefore a paradigmatic deviance, that is, precisely the kind of deviance described by classical rhetoricians. Classical rhetoric, in that sense, was not wrong, but it only described the "effect of sense" at the level of the word while it overlooked the production of this semantic twist at the level of sense. While it is true that the effect of sense is focused on the word, the production of sense is borne by the whole utterance. It is in that way that the theory of metaphor hinges on a semantics of the sentence.

Such is the main presupposition of the following analysis. The first question is to understand how resemblance works in this production of meaning. The next step will be to connect in the right way the pictorial or iconic moment to this work of resemblance.

As concerns the first step, the work of resemblance as such, it seems to me that we are still only halfway to a full understanding of the semantic innovation which characterizes metaphorical phrases or sentences if we underline only the aspect of deviance in metaphor, even if we distinguish the semantic impertinence which requires the lexical deviance from this lexical deviance itself, as described by Aristotle and all classical rhetoricians. The decisive feature is the semantic innovation, thanks to which a new pertinence, a new congruence, is established in such a way that the utterance "makes sense" as a whole. The maker of metaphors is this craftsman with verbal skill who, from an inconsistent utterance for a literal interpretation, draws a significant utterance for a new interpretation which deserves to be called metaphorical because it generates the metaphor not only as deviant but as acceptable. In other words, metaphorical meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash but of the new predicative meaning which emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning, that is, from the collapse of the meaning which obtains if we rely only on the common or usual lexical values of our words. The metaphor is not the enigma but the solution of the enigma.

It is here, in the mutation characteristic of the semantic innovation, that similarity and accordingly imagination play a role. But which role? I think that this role cannot be but misunderstood as long as one has in mind the Humean theory of image as a faint impression, that is, as a perceptual residue. It is no better understood if one shifts to the other tradition, according to which imagination can be reduced to the alternation between two modalities of association, either by contiguity or by similarity. Unfortunately, this prejudice has been assumed by such important theoreticians as Jakobson, for whom the metaphoric process is
opposed to the metonymic process in the same way as the substitution of one sign for another within a sphere of similarity is opposed to the concatenation between signs along a string of contiguity. What must be understood and underscored is a mode of functioning of similarity and accordingly of imagination which is immanent—that is, nonextrinsic—to the predicative process itself. In other words, the work of resemblance has to be appropriate and homogeneous to the deviance and the oddness and the freshness of the semantic innovation itself.

How is this possible? I think that the decisive problem that an interaction theory of metaphor has helped to delineate but not to solve is the transition from literal incongruence to metaphorical congruence between two semantic fields. Here the metaphor of space is useful. It is as though a change of distance between meanings occurred within a logical space. The new pertinence or congruence proper to a meaningful metaphoric utterance proceeds from the kind of semantic proximity which suddenly obtains between terms in spite of their distance. Things or ideas which were remote appear now as close. Resemblance ultimately is nothing else than this rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship between heterogeneous ideas. What Aristotle called the epiphora of the metaphor, that is, the transfer of meaning, is nothing else than this move or shift in the logical distance, from the far to the near. The lacuna of some recent theories of metaphor, including Max Black’s, concerns precisely the innovation proper to this shift.²

It is the first task of an appropriate theory of imagination to plug this hole. But this theory of imagination must deliberately break with Hume and draw on Kant, specifically on Kant’s concept of productive imagination as schematizing a synthetic operation. This will provide us with the first step in our attempt to adjust a psychology of imagination to a semantics of metaphor or, if you prefer, to complete a semantics of metaphor by having recourse to a psychology of imagination. There will be three steps in this attempt of adjustment and of completion.

In the first step, imagination is understood as the “seeing,” still homogeneous to discourse itself, which effects the shift in logical distance, the rapprochement itself. The place and the role of productive imagination is there, in the insight, to which Aristotle alluded when he said that to make good metaphors is to contemplate likeness—theorein to omoioin. This insight into likeness is both a thinking and a seeing. It is a

2. Black’s explanation of the metaphorical process by the “system of associated commonplaces” leaves unsolved the problem of innovation, as the following reservations and qualifications suggest: “Metaphors,” he says, “can be supported by specifically constructed systems of implications as well as by accepted commonplaces” (Models and Metaphors [Ithaca, N.Y., 1962], p. 43). And further: “These implications usually consist of commonplaces about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer” (p. 44). How are we to think of these implications that are created on the spot?
thinking to the extent that it effects a restructuration of semantic fields; it is transcategorical because it is categorical. This can be shown on the basis of the kind of metaphor in which the logical aspect of this restructuration is the most conspicuous, the metaphor which Aristotle called metaphor by analogy, that is, the proportional metaphor: A is to B what C is to D. The cup is to Dionysus what the shield is to Ares. Therefore we may say, by shifting terms, Dionysus' shield or Ares' cup. But this thinking is a seeing, to the extent that the insight consists of the instantaneous grasping of the combinatorial possibilities offered by the proportionality and consequently the establishment of the proportionality by the rapprochement between the two ratios. I suggest we call this productive character of the insight predicative assimilation. But we miss entirely its semantic role if we interpret it in terms of the old association by resemblance. A kind of mechanical attraction between mental atoms is thereby substituted for an operation homogeneous to language and to its nuclear act, the predication act. The assimilation consists precisely in making similar, that is, semantically proximate, the terms that the metaphorical utterance brings together.

Some will probably object to my ascribing to the imagination this predicative assimilation. Without returning to my earlier critique of the prejudices concerning the imagination itself which may prevent the analysts from doing justice to productive imagination, I want to underscore a trait of predicative assimilation which may support my contention that the rapprochement characteristic of the metaphorical process offers a typical kinship to Kant's schematism. I mean the paradoxical character of the predicative assimilation which has been compared by some authors to Ryle's concept of "category mistake," which consists in presenting the facts pertaining to one category in the terms appropriate to another. All new rapprochement runs against a previous categorization which resists, or rather which yields while resisting, as Nelson Goodman says. This is what the idea of a semantic impertinence or incongruence preserves. In order that a metaphor obtains, one must continue to identify the previous incompatibility through the new compatibility. The predicative assimilation involves, in that way, a specific kind of tension which is not so much between a subject and a predicate as between semantic incongruence and congruence. The insight into likeness is the perception of the conflict between the previous incompatibility and the new compatibility. "Remoteness" is preserved within "proximity." To see the like is to see the same in spite of, and through, the different. This tension between sameness and difference characterizes the logical structure of likeness. Imagination, accordingly, is this ability to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce them not above the differences, as in the concept, but in spite of and through the differences. Imagination is this stage in the production of genres where generic kinship has not reached the level of conceptual peace and rest but remains caught in the war
between distance and proximity, between remoteness and nearness. In that sense, we may speak with Gadamer of the fundamental metaphoricity of thought to the extent that the figure of speech that we call "metaphor" allows us a glance at the general procedure by which we produce concepts. This is because in the metaphoric process the movement toward the genus is arrested by the resistance of the difference and, as it were, intercepted by the figure of rhetoric.

Such is the first function of imagination in the process of semantic innovation. Imagination has not yet been considered under its sensible, quasi-optic aspect but under its quasi-verbal aspect. However, the latter is the condition of the former. We first have to understand an image, according to Bachelard's remark in the _Poetics of Space_, as "a being pertaining to language."3 Before being a fading perception, the image is an emerging meaning. Such is, in fact, the tradition of Kant's productive imagination and schematism. What we have above described is nothing else than the schematism of metaphorical attribution.

The next step will be to incorporate into the semantics of metaphor the second aspect of imagination, its _pictorial_ dimension. It is this aspect which is at stake in the _figurative_ character of metaphor. It is also this aspect which was intended by I. A. Richards' distinction between tenor and vehicle. This distinction is not entirely absorbed in the one Black makes between frame and focus. Frame and focus designate only the contextual setting—say, the sentence as a whole—and the term which is the bearer of the shift of meaning, whereas tenor and vehicle designate the conceptual import and its pictorial envelope. The first function of imagination was to give an account of the frame/focus interplay; its second function is to give an account of the difference of level between tenor and vehicle or, in other words, of the way in which a semantic innovation is not only schematized but pictured. Paul Henle borrows from Charles Sanders Peirce the distinction between sign and icon and speaks of the _iconic_ aspect of metaphor.4 If there are two thoughts in one in a metaphor, there is one which is intended; the other is the concrete aspect _under_ which the first one is presented. In Keats' verse "When by my solitary hearth I sit / And hateful thoughts enwrap my soul in gloom," the metaphorical expression "enwrap" consists in presenting sorrow as if it were capable of enveloping the soul in a cloak. Henle comments: "We are led [by figurative discourse] to think of something by a consideration of something like it, and this is what constitutes the iconic mode of signifying."

Someone might object at this point that we are in danger of re-introducing an obsolete theory of the image, in the Humean sense of a weakened sensorial impression. This is therefore the place to recall a

remark made by Kant that one of the functions of the schema is to provide images for a concept. In the same vein, Henle writes: "If there is an iconic element in metaphor it is equally clear that the icon is not presented, but merely described." And further: "What is presented is a formula for the construction of icons." What we have therefore to show is that if this new extension of the role of imagination is not exactly included in the previous one, it makes sense for a semantic theory only to the extent that it is controlled by it. What is at issue is the development from schematization to iconic presentation.

The enigma of iconic presentation is the way in which depiction occurs in predicative assimilation: something appears on which we read the new connection. The enigma remains unsolved as long as we treat the image as a mental picture, that is, as the replica of an absent thing. Then the image must remain foreign to the process, extrinsic to predicative assimilation.

We have to understand the process by which a certain production of images channels the schematization of predicative assimilation. By displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical distance, generates rapprochement. Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction concerns unsaid and unheard similarities or refers to qualities, structures, localizations, situations, attitudes, or feelings, each time the new intended connection is grasped as what the icon describes or depicts.

It is in this way, I think, that one can do justice within a semantic theory of metaphor to the Wittgensteinian concept of "seeing as." Wittgenstein himself did not extend this analysis beyond the field of perception and beyond the process of interpretation made obvious by the case of ambiguous "Gestalten," as in the famous duck/rabbit drawing. Marcus B. Hester, in his *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor*, has attempted to extend the concept of "seeing as" to the functioning of poetic images. Describing the experience of *reading*, he shows that the kind of images which are interesting for a theory of poetic language are not those that interrupt reading and distort or divert it. These images—these "wild" images, if I may say so—are properly extrinsic to the fabric of sense. They induce the reader, who has become a dreamer rather than a reader, to indulge himself in the delusive attempt, described by Sartre as fascination, to possess magically the absent thing, body, or person. The kind of images which still belong to the production of sense are rather what Hester calls "bound" images, that is, concrete representations aroused by the verbal element and controlled by it. Poetic

language, says Hester, is this language which not only merges sense and sound, as many theoreticians have said, but sense and senses, meaning by that the flow of bound images displayed by the sense. We are not very far from what Bachelard called *retentissement* [reverberation]. In reading, Bachelard says, the verbal meaning generates images which, so to speak, rejuvenate and reenact the traces of sensorial experience. Yet it is not the process of reverberation which expands the schematization and, in Kant's words, provides a concept with an image. In fact, as the experience of reading shows, this display of images ranges from schematization without full-blown images to wild images which distract thought more than they instruct it. The kind of images which are relevant for a semantics of the poetic image are those which belong to the intermediary range of the scale, which are, therefore, the bound images of Hester's theory. These images bring to concrete completion the metaphorical process. The meaning is then depicted under the features of ellipsis. Through this depiction, the meaning is not only schematized but lets itself be read on the image in which it is inverted. Or, to put it another way, the metaphorical sense is generated in the thickness of the imagining scene displayed by the verbal structure of the poem. Such is, to my mind, the functioning of the intuitive grasp of a predicative connection.

I do not deny that this second stage of our theory of imagination has brought us to the borderline between pure semantics and psychology or, more precisely, to the borderline between a semantics of productive imagination and a psychology of reproductive imagination. But the metaphorical meaning, as I said in the introduction, is precisely this kind of meaning which denies the well-established distinction between sense and representation, to evoke once more Frege's opposition between *Sinn* and *Vorstellung*. By blurring this distinction, the metaphorical meaning compels us to explore the borderline between the verbal and the non-verbal. The process of schematization and that of the bound images aroused and controlled by schematization obtain precisely on that borderline between a semantics of metaphorical utterances and a psychology of imagination.

The third and final step in our attempt to complete a semantic theory of metaphor with a proper consideration of the role of imagination concerns what I shall call the "suspension" or, if you prefer, the moment of negativity brought by the image in the metaphorical process.

In order to understand this new contribution of the image to this process, we have to come back to the basic notion of meaning as applied to a metaphorical expression. By meaning we may understand—as we have in the preceding as well—the inner functioning of the proposition as a predicative operation, for example, in Black's vocabulary, the "filter" or the "screen" effect of the subsidiary subject on the main subject. Meaning, then, is nothing else than what Frege called *Sinn* [sense], in
contradistinction to Bedeutung [reference or denotation]. But to ask about what a metaphorical statement is, is something other and something more than to ask what it says.

The question of reference in metaphor is a particular case of the more general question of the truth claim of poetic language. As Goodman says in Languages of Art, all symbolic systems are denotative in the sense that they "make" and "remake" reality. To raise the question of the referential value of poetic language is to try to show how symbolic systems reorganize "the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world."6 At that point the theory of metaphor tends to merge with that of models to the extent that a metaphor may be seen as a model for changing our way of looking at things, of perceiving the world. The word "insight," very often applied to the cognitive import of metaphor, conveys in a very appropriate manner this move from sense to reference which is no less obvious in poetic discourse than in so-called descriptive discourse. Here, too, we do not restrict ourselves to talking about ideas nor, as Frege says of proper names, "are we satisfied with the sense alone." "We presuppose besides a reference," the "striving for truth," which prompts "our intention in speaking or thinking" and "drives us always to advance from the sense of the reference."7

But the paradox of metaphorical reference is that its functioning is as odd as that of the metaphorical sense. At first glance, poetic language refers to nothing but itself. In a classic essay entitled "Word and Language," which defines the poetic function of language in relation to the other functions implied in any communicative transaction, Jakobson bluntly opposes the poetic function of the message to its referential function. On the contrary, the referential function prevails in descriptive language, be it ordinary or scientific. Descriptive language, he says, is not about itself, not inwardly oriented, but outwardly directed. Here language, so to speak, effaces itself for the sake of what is said about reality. "The poetic function—which is more than mere poetry—lays the stress on the palpable side of the signs, underscores the message for its own sake and deepens the fundamental dichotomy between signs and objects."8 The poetic function and the referential function, accordingly, seem to be polar opposites. The latter directs language toward the non-linguistic context, the former directs message toward itself.

This analysis seems to strengthen some other classical arguments among literary critics and more specifically in the structuralist camp according to which not only poetry but literature in general implies a mutation in the use of language. This redirects language toward itself to

the point that language may be said, in Roland Barthes' words, to "celebrate itself" rather than to celebrate the world.

My contention is that these arguments are not false but give an incomplete picture of the whole process of reference in poetic discourse. Jakobson himself acknowledged that what happens in poetry is not the suppression of the referential function but its profound alteration by the workings of the ambiguity of the message itself. "The supremacy of poetic function over referential function," he says, "does not obliterare the reference but makes it ambiguous. The double-sensed message finds correspondence in a split addressee, in a split addressee, and what is more, in a split reference, as is cogently exposed in the preambles to fairy tales of various people, for instance, in the usual exortation of the Majorca story tellers: Aixo era y no era (it was and it was not)."9

I suggest that we take the expression "split reference" as our leading line in our discussion of the referential function of the metaphorical statement. This expression, as well as the wonderful "it was and it was not," contains in nuce all that can be said about metaphorical reference. To summarize, poetic language is no less about reality than any other use of language but refers to it by the means of a complex strategy which implies, as an essential component, a suspension and seemingly an abolition of the ordinary reference attached to descriptive language. This suspension, however, is only the negative condition of a second-order reference, of an indirect reference built on the ruins of the direct reference. This reference is called second-order reference only with respect to the primacy of the reference of ordinary language. For, in another respect, it constitutes the primordial reference to the extent that it suggests, reveals, unconceals—or whatever you say—the deep structures of reality to which we are related as mortals who are born into this world and who dwell in it for a while.

This is not the place to discuss the ontological implications of this contention nor to ascertain its similarities and dissimilarities with Husserl's concept of Lebenswelt or with Heidegger's concept of In-der-Welt-Sein. I want to emphasize, for the sake of our further discussion of the role of imagination in the completion of the meaning of metaphor, the mediating role of the suspension—or epoché—of ordinary descriptive reference in connection with the ontological claims of poetic discourse. This mediating role of the epoché in the functioning of the reference in metaphor is in complete agreement with the interpretation we have given to the functioning of sense. The sense of a novel metaphor, we said, is the emergence of a new semantic congruence or pertinence from the ruins of the literal sense shattered by semantic incompatibility or absurdity. In the same way as the self-abolition of literal sense is the

9. As found in my The Rule of Metaphor, p. 224.
negative condition for the emergence of the metaphorical sense, the suspension of the reference proper to ordinary descriptive language is the negative condition for the emergence of a more radical way of looking at things, whether it is akin or not to the unconcealing of that layer of reality which phenomenology calls preobjective and which, according to Heidegger, constitutes the horizon of all our modes of dwelling in the world. Once more, what interests me here is the parallelism between the suspension of literal sense and the suspension of ordinary descriptive reference. This parallelism goes very far. In the same way as the metaphorical sense not only abolishes but preserves the literal sense, the metaphorical reference maintains the ordinary vision in tension with the new one it suggests. As Berggren says in "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor": "The possibility or comprehension of metaphorical constructing requires, therefore, a peculiar and rather sophisticated intellectual ability which W. Bedell Stanford metaphorically labels 'stereoscopic vision': the ability to entertain two different points of view at the same time. That is to say, the perspective prior to and subsequent to the transformation of the metaphor's principle and subsidiary subjects must both be conjointly maintained."10

But what Bedell Stanford called stereoscopic vision is nothing else than what Jakobson called split reference: ambiguity in reference.

My contention now is that one of the functions of imagination is to give a concrete dimension to the suspension or époché proper to split reference. Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative assimilation between terms by its synthetic insight into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes concretely to the époché of ordinary reference and to the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world.

In a sense, all époché is the work of the imagination. Imagination is époché. As Sartre emphasized, to imagine is to address oneself to what is not. More radically, to imagine is to make oneself absent to the whole of things. Yet I do not want to elaborate further this thesis of the negativity proper to the image. What I do want to underscore is the solidarity between the époché and the capacity to project new possibilities. Image as absence is the negative side of image as fiction. It is to this aspect of the image as fiction that is attached the power of symbolic systems to "re-make" reality, to return to Goodman's idiom. But this productive and projective function of fiction can only be acknowledged if one sharply distinguishes it from the reproductive role of the so-called mental image which merely provides us with a re-presentation of things already perceived. Fiction addresses itself to deeply rooted potentialities of reality to

the extent that they are absent from the actualities with which we deal in
everyday life under the mode of empirical control and manipulation. In
that sense, fiction presents under a concrete mode the split structure of
the reference pertaining to the metaphorical statement. It both reflects
and completes it. It reflects it in the sense that the mediating role of the
epoché proper to the image is homogeneous to the paradoxical structure
of the cognitive process of reference. The "it was and it was not" of the
Majorca storytellers rules both the split reference of the metaphorical
statement and the contradictory structure of fiction. Yet, we may say as
well that the structure of the fiction not only reflects but completes the
logical structure of the split reference. The poet is this genius who gen-
erates split references by creating fictions. It is in fiction that the "ab-
sence" proper to the power of suspending what we call "reality" in ordi-
nary language concretely coalesces and fuses with the positive insight into
the potentialities of our being in the world which our everyday trans-
actions with manipulatable objects tend to conceal.

You may have noticed that until now I have said nothing concerning
feelings in spite of the commitment implied in this paper's title to deal
with the problem of the connection between cognition, imagination, and
feeling. I have no intention to elude this problem.

Imagination and feeling have always been closely linked in classical
theories of metaphor. We cannot forget that rhetoric has always been
defined as a strategy of discourse aiming at persuading and pleasing.
And we know the central role played by pleasure in the aesthetics of
Kant. A theory of metaphor, therefore, is not complete if it does not give
an account of the place and role of feeling in the metaphorical process.

My contention is that feeling has a place not just in theories of
metaphor which deny the cognitive import of metaphor. These theories
ascribe a substitutive role to image and feeling due to the metaphor's
lack of informative value. In addition, I claim that feeling as well as
imagination are genuine components in the process described in an
interaction theory of metaphor. They both achieve the semantic bearing
of metaphor.

I have already tried to show the way in which a psychology of imagina-
tion has to be integrated into a semantics of metaphor. I will now try to
extend the same kind of description to feeling. A bad psychology of
imagination in which imagination is conceived as a residue of perception
prevents us from acknowledging the constructive role of imagination. In
the same way, a bad psychology of feeling is responsible for a similar
misunderstanding. Indeed, our natural inclination is to speak of feeling
in terms appropriate to emotion, that is, to affections conceived as (1)
inwardly directed states of mind, and (2) mental experiences closely tied
to bodily disturbances, as is the case in fear, anger, pleasure, and pain. In
fact both traits come together. To the extent that in emotion we are, so to
speak, under the spell of our body, we are delivered to mental states with
little intentionality, as though in emotion we "lived" our body in a more intense way.

Genuine feelings are not emotions, as may be shown by feelings which are rightly called poetic feelings. Just like the corresponding images which they reverberate, they enjoy a specific kinship with language. They are properly displayed by the poem as a verbal texture. But how are they linked to its meaning?

I suggest that we construe the role of feeling according to the three similar moments which provided an articulation to my theory of imagination.

Feelings, first, accompany and complete imagination in its function of schematization of the new predicative congruence. This schematization, as I said, is a kind of insight into the mixture of "like" and "unlike" proper to similarity. Now we may say that this instantaneous grasping of the new congruence is "felt" as well as "seen." By saying that it is felt, we underscore the fact that we are included in the process as knowing subjects. If the process can be called, as I called it, predicative assimilation, it is true that we are assimilated, that is, made similar, to what is seen as similar. This self-assimilation is a part of the commitment proper to the "illocutionary" force of the metaphor as speech act. We feel like what we see like.

If we are somewhat reluctant to acknowledge this contribution of feeling to the illocutionary act of metaphorical statements, it is because we keep applying to feeling our usual interpretation of emotion as both inner and bodily states. We then miss the specific structure of feeling. As Stephan Strasser shows in Das Gemut [The heart], a feeling is a second-order intentional structure. It is a process of interiorization succeeding a movement of intentional transcending directed toward some objective state of affairs. To feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is to make ours what has been put at a distance by thought in its objectifying phase. Feelings, therefore, have a very complex kind of intentionality. They are not merely inner states but interiorized thoughts. It is as such that they accompany and complete the work of imagination as schematizing a synthetic operation: they make the schematized thought ours. Feeling, then, is a case of Selbst-Affektion, in the sense Kant used it in the second edition of the Critique. This Selbst-Affektion, in turn, is a part of what we call poetic feeling. Its function is to abolish the distance between knower and known without canceling the cognitive structure of thought and the intentional distance which it implies. Feeling is not contrary to thought. It is thought made ours. This felt participation is a part of its complete meaning as poem.

Feelings, furthermore, accompany and complete imagination as picturing relationships. This aspect of feeling has been emphasized by

11. Stephan Strasser, Das Gemut (Freiberg, 1956).
Northrop Frye in *Anatomy of Criticism* under the designation of "mood." Each poem, he says, structures a mood which is *this* unique mood generated by *this* unique string of words. In that sense, it is coextensive to the verbal structure itself. The mood is nothing other than the way in which the poem affects us as an *icon*. Frye offers strong expression here: "The unity of a poem is the unity of a mood"; the poetic images "express or articulate this mood. This mood is the poem and nothing else behind it."\(^{12}\) In my own terms, I would say, in a tentative way, that the mood is the *iconic as felt*. Perhaps we could arrive at the same assumption by starting from Goodman's concept of *dense* vs. *discrete* symbols. Dense symbols are felt as dense. That does not mean, once more, that feelings are radically opaque and ineffable. "Density" is a mode of articulation just as discreteness is. Or, to speak in Pascal's terms, the "esprit de finesse" is no less thought than the "esprit géométrique." However, I leave these suggestions open to discussion.

Finally, the most important function of feelings can be construed according to the third feature of imagination, that is, its contribution to the split reference of poetic discourse. The imagination contributes to it, as I said, owing to its own split structure. On the one hand, imagination entails the *epoché*, the suspension, of the direct reference of thought to the objects of our ordinary discourse. On the other hand, imagination provides *models for* reading reality in a new way. This split structure is the structure of imagination as fiction.

What could be the counterpart and the complement of this split structure at the level of feelings? My contention is that feelings, too, display a split structure which completes the split structure pertaining to the cognitive component of metaphor.

On the one hand, feelings—I mean poetic feelings—imply a kind of *epoché* of our bodily emotions. Feelings are negative, suspensive experiences in relation to the literal emotions of everyday life. When we read, we do not literally feel fear or anger. Just as poetic language denies the first-order reference of descriptive discourse to ordinary objects of our concern, feelings deny the first-order feelings which tie us to these first-order objects of reference.

But this denial, too, is only the reverse side of a more deeply rooted operation of feeling which is to insert us within the world in a nonobjectifying manner. That feelings are not merely the denial of emotions but their metamorphosis has been explicitly asserted by Aristotle in his analysis of catharsis. But this analysis remains trivial as long as it is not interpreted in relation to the split reference of the cognitive and the imaginative function of poetic discourse. It is the tragic poem itself, as thought (*dianoia*), which displays specific feelings which are the poetic transposition—I mean the transposition by means of poetic *language*.

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—of fear and compassion, that is, of feelings of the first order, of emotions. The tragic phobos and the tragic eleos (terror and pity, as some translators say) are both the denial and the transfiguration of the literal feelings of fear and compassion.

On the basis of this analysis of the split structure of poetic feeling, it is possible to do justice to a certain extent to a claim of Heidegger's analytic of the Dasein that feelings have ontological bearing, that they are ways of "being-there," of "finding" ourselves within the world, to keep something of the semantic intent of the German Befindlichkeit. Because of feelings we are "attuned to" aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language. Our entire analysis of the split reference of both language and feeling is in agreement with this claim. But it must be underscored that this analysis of Befindlichkeit makes sense only to the extent that it is paired with that of split reference both in verbal and imaginative structures. If we miss this fundamental connection, we are tempted to construe this concept of Befindlichkeit as a new kind of intuitionism—and the worst kind!—in the form of a new emotional realism. We miss, in Heidegger's Daseinanalyse itself, the close connections between Befindlichkeit and Verstehen, between situation and project, between anxiety and interpretation. The ontological bearing of feeling cannot be separated from the negative process applied to the first-order emotions, such as fear and sympathy, according to the Aristotelian paradigm of catharsis. With this qualification in mind, we may assume the Heideggerian thesis that it is mainly through feelings that we are attuned to reality. But this attunement is nothing else than the reverberation in terms of feelings of the split reference of both verbal and imaginative structure.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize the points which I submit to discussion:

1. There are three main presuppositions on which the rest of my analysis relies: (a) metaphor is an act of predication rather than of denomination; (b) a theory of deviance is not enough to give an account of the emergence of a new congruence at the predicative level; and (c) the notion of metaphorical sense is not complete without a description of the split reference which is specific to poetic discourse.

2. On this threefold basis, I have tried to show that imagination and feeling are not extrinsic to the emergence of the metaphorical sense and of the split reference. They are not substitutive for a lack of informative content in metaphorical statements, but they complete their full cognitive intent.

3. But the price to pay for the last point is a theory of imagination and of feeling which is still in infancy. The burden of my argument is that the notion of poetic image and of poetic feeling has to be construed in accordance with the cognitive component, understood itself as a ten-
sion between congruence and incongruence at the level of sense, between *epoché* and commitment at the level of reference.

4. My paper suggests that there is a *structural analogy* between the cognitive, the imaginative, and the emotional components of the complete metaphorical act and that the metaphorical process draws its concreteness and its completeness from this structural analogy and this complementary functioning.