Title: "Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value-Reflecting Reasons"

It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology – in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship would require one to give a friend the benefit of the doubt, and thereby come to believe something in violation of ordinary epistemic standards on justified or responsible belief (Baker 1987, Keller 2004, Stroud 2006, and Hazlett 2013). The burden of this paper is to explain these appearances away. I contend that the impression of epistemic partiality in friendship dissipates once we acknowledge the sorts of practical and epistemic reasons that are generated by our values:value-reflecting reasons.  Unlike other proposals seeking to resist the arguments for epistemic partiality, the present proposal has the virtue of remaining neutral with respect to two controversial epistemic doctrines (Uniqueness and Pragmatic Encroachment).